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COMPENSATING A CALIFORNIA WRONGFUL
LIFE PLAINTIFF FOR GENERAL DAMAGES AND
DAMAGES FOR LOST EARNING CAPACITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a child is born with a debilitating impairment that could
have been discovered through genetic testing. Now envision that
genetic testing does discern the potential birth defect, and the parents
decide not to conceive the child. These two contrasting scenarios
illustrate the "abstract ' 1 tort of wrongful life where a child plaintiff
"alleg[es] that, due to the negligence of the defendant [doctor], birth
occurred.",2 In essence, the child asserts that his parents would not
have conceived had the doctor properly warned them of the potential
birth defect, thus sparing him "his impaired existence."3
Although California recognizes the wrongful life cause of
action, California courts are unwilling to award general damages-
compensation for pain and suffering 4 -or damages for loss of
earning capacity.5 Courts reason that both types of damages are
incalculable because it is too difficult for the jury to determine
whether the child suffered a legally cognizable injury, and it is
1. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828-29,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). "The real crux of the [wrongful life] problem
is whether the breach of duty [is] the proximate cause of an injury cognizable
at law. The injury, of course, is not the particular defect with which a plaintiff
is afflicted.., but it is the birth of [the] plaintiff with such defect." Id.
2. Id. at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
3. See Timothy J. Dawe, Note, Wrongful Life: Time for a "Day in Court",
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 475 (1990).
4. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 236-37, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 347 (1982); see also infra Part VI.B. (explaining why courts
should award general damages in wrongful life cases and proposing an
alternative method of analysis to calculate general damages).
5. See Andalon v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 614, 208 Cal. Rptr.
899, 907-08 (1984); see also infra Part VII. (discussing how damages for loss
of earning capacity are comparable to special damages and should be awarded
in wrongful life cases).
1677
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1677
"impossible" to measure an appropriate damages award.6 In
wrongful life cases, the California Supreme Court has awarded only
special damages--compensation for the additional medical expenses
required to treat the child for an impairment brought about by the
doctor's negligence.7 However, because California courts refuse to
award either general damages or damages for lost earning capacity in
wrongful life cases,8 the victims of negligent physicians are not
afforded a just remedy. Reimbursement for medical expenses is not
just compensation for a lifetime of debilitating impairment.
California courts apply an inappropriate analysis to the wrongful
life cause of action, which leads them to mistakenly conclude that it
is impossible to determine whether a child has suffered a legally
cognizable injury. Furthermore, courts incorrectly conclude that
general damages and damages for lost earnings are incalculable. 9
This Note proposes an alternative analysis that California courts
should use to ascertain whether a child has suffered a legally
cognizable injury. In considering wrongful life claims, the court
should submit two questions to the jury in the form of a special
verdict. The first question considers the severity of the impairment
and the second looks at how closely connected the defendant doctor
is to the plaintiff's injury. Under the proposed analysis, the jury will
be able to clearly determine whether there is a legally cognizable
injury and make a "calculable"' 0 decision for both general damages
and damages for lost earning capacity. Thus, more victims will be
compensated for their impaired existence.
Part II of this Note provides a discussion of the history and case
law development of the wrongful life causes of action in New Jersey,
Washington, and California. Part III discusses the current analysis
California courts use to approach a wrongful life claim. Part IV
focuses on the 2002 California Court of Appeal ruling in Johnson v.
6. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
346.
7. See id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
8. See id.; Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08.
9. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235-37, 643 P.2d at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
346-47; Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08.
10. Cf Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235-37, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347
(explaining the incalculable nature of the harm-benefit equation in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
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Superior Court1 to illustrate California's current inappropriate
approach to a wrongful life cause of action. Part V discusses general
damages and argues that the California Supreme Court's decision in
Turpin v. Sortini,12 which denied general damages to the child
plaintiff, was wrongfully decided because the court failed to consider
crucial public policy that supports a general damages award. Part VI
criticizes the current analytical approach California courts use to
decide wrongful life claims and proposes an alternative method of
analysis: a special verdict approach that will compensate more
plaintiffs for a life of impaired existence. Finally, Part VII explores
damages for lost earning capacity and explains that because damages
for lost earning capacity are comparable to special damages,1 3 courts
should approach these two types of damages similarly. In the
alternative, courts should use the proposed special verdict approach
in considering lost earning capacity, ensuring that at least some
plaintiffs' injuries are redressed rather than categorically excluding
all damages for loss of earning capacity.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION
The wrongful life cause of action was first recognized in 1964,
in the Illinois case Zepeda v. Zepeda.14 There, the plaintiff was an
illegitimate child who brought a damages claim against his father for
his out-of-wedlock status. Although the court recognized the new
wrongful life cause of action, the court refused to allow damages
because "the doors of litigation would be opened wider... [and]
encouragement would extend to all others born into the world under
conditions they might regard as adverse."'16
The next court to deal with the wrongful life cause of action was
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove. 7 There,
the plaintiff alleged that doctors "affirmatively misled" her that
rubella during her pregnancy would not cause birth defects to her
11. 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Ct. App. 2002).
12. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337.
13. Courts generally tend to award special damages to a wrongful life
plaintiff. See infra Part VII.
14. 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
15. See id. at 851.
16. Id. at 858.
17. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
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baby who was "then in gestation." 18  The court denied general
damages, stating it is impossible to "weigh the value of life with
impairments against the nonexistence of life itself."' 9
In 1980, however, the wrongful life cause of action gained
momentum when the California Court of Appeal awarded both
general and special damages to the child plaintiff in Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories. 20 In Curlender, the parents retained the
defendant laboratories to administer tests to discern whether they
were carriers of Tay-Sachs disease.2 1  However, "'incorrect and
inaccurate' information was disseminated to [the] plaintiffs parents
concerning their status as carriers."2 2  Subsequently, the child
plaintiff was born with Tay-Sachs disease.23 The court explained
that the wrongful life concept is not a notion of metaphysics, stating
that "[t]he reality of the 'wrongful-life' concept is that such a
plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. 24
Nevertheless, the Curlender court's "reality" approach was
merely transitory. Just two years later, the California Supreme Court
in Turpin awarded special damages but denied general damages to a
wrongful life plaintiff.25 In that case, hearing specialists incorrectly
advised the plaintiffs parents that their first-born child was within
normal hearing range.26 In reality, the child was "stone deaf," the
27result of a hereditary hearing impairment. Because this hereditary
affliction was unbeknownst to the parents, they conceived a second
child who was born with the same hereditary hearing impairment as
their first child.28 The California Supreme Court denied general
damages because the plaintiff did not suffer a "legally cognizable
injury" and there were no "rationally ascertainable damages. 29
However, the court did permit the plaintiff to recover special
18. Id. at 691.
19. Id. at 692.
20. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
21. See id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
24. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
25. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 349 (1982).
26. See id. at 223, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
29. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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damages, reasoning that compensation for "the extraordinary,
additional medical expenses that are occasioned by the hereditary
ailment"30 was consistent with the "benefit" doctrine in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.31 The court noted that "[u]nlike the
claim for general damages, [the] defendants' negligence ha[d]
conferred no incidental, offsetting benefit" to the plaintiffs burden
of extraordinary out-of-pocket medical expenses.32
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court allowed recovery for
special damages in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.33 In that case, the
doctors failed to warn the child plaintiff's mother that use of the drug
Dilantin to control seizures could cause serious birth defects.34 The
child plaintiff was born with fetal hydantoin syndrome,35 a rare
disorder that causes "abnormalities of the skull and facial
features.. . and/or mild developmental delays. 36 Citing Turpin, the
Washington Supreme Court awarded special damages to cover the
"extraordinary medical expenses" associated with the child
plaintiff's impairment.37
Finally, the California Court of Appeal denied damages for lost
earning capacity in Andalon v. Superior Court,38 reasoning that
damages for lost earning capacity were comparable to general
damages.39 In Andalon, the child plaintiff alleged that the defendant
doctor's negligent prenatal care of his mother caused him to be born
with Down Syndrome.40 The court stated that, like the claim for
general damages in Turpin, "[t]here is no loss of earning capacity
caused by the doctor in negligently permitting the child to be born
30. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
31. See id. at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)).
32. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
33. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
34. See id. at 486.
35. See id.
36. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Health Library: Illnesses &
Conditions-Fetal Hydantoin Syndrome, at http://health-info.nmh.org/
Library/HealthGuide/IllnessConditions/topic.asp?hwid-nord948 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2003).
37. See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495.
38. 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
39. See id. at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08.
40. See id. at 603-04, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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with a genetic defect that precludes earning a living. One cannot
lose what one never had."4' 1
III. METHOD OF WRONGFUL LIFE JURISPRUDENCE
In California, a wrongful life claim is analyzed within the
context of a professional malpractice action.42 There are five
elements in a professional malpractice cause of action: (1) duty; (2)
breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; (4) legally cognizable
injury; and (5) damages.43
A. Duty
The defendant doctor has the duty to "use such skill, prudence,
and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess
and exercise." Duty is not normally a disputed element in a
wrongful life case. For instance, in Turpin, the defendant doctors did
not "contend that they owed no duty of care... to [the child
plaintiff]., 45 Furthermore, in Harbeson, the Washington Supreme
Court assumed "that physicians have a duty to the child to prevent
birth in an impaired condition by informing the parents of the risks of
birth defects. 46
B. Breach of that Duty
Similar to the duty analysis, breach is generally not a contested
issue.47 In Turpin, although the Turpins' oldest daughter was the
defendants' immediate patient, the court found that "it was
reasonably foreseeable that... parents and their potential offspring
41. Id. at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
42. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229, 643 P.2d 954, 959, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 342 (1982).
43. See id. at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing Budd v.
Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971)).
44. Budd v. Nixon, 6 Cal.3d 195,200, 491 P.2d 433,436, 98 Cal.Rptr. 849,
852 (1971) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971)).
45. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 940, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
46. Philip J. VanDerhoef, Washington Recognizes Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life-A Critical Analysis-Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 58 WASH.
L. REv. 649, 672-73 (1983).
47. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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would be directly affected by [the] defendants' negligent failure to
discover that [their daughter] suffered from an hereditary ailment.
' 48
C. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause exists where there is a "causal connection
between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury."49  This
element is also generally not disputed, as the court's analysis is
merely "superficial." 50 For instance, in Turpin, the defendants never
contended that the plaintiffs birth was not a "proximate result of the
breach."51
D. Legally Cognizable Injury
Although sometimes the issues of a legally cognizable injury
and damages are considered inseparable, the Turpin court "treated
the two as distinct matters., 52 Because the Turpin court used a two-
prong analysis-first considering whether there was a legally
cognizable injury, and, if so, then considering damages-this Note
will take the same approach.53 In order to determine if there is a
legally cognizable injury, a court will analyze whether
"'nonexistence-never being born-would have been preferable to
existence in [the] diseased state.'
54
E. Damages
Damages are the "actual loss . . . resulting from the
professional's negligence." 55 In wrongful life suits, plaintiffs have
argued for general damages, special damages, and damages for lost
earning capacity. General damages are "market-measured damages,"
where the court "attempts to make sure the defendant's tort.., does
not leave the plaintiff with... [a] net worth less than that to which
48. Id.
49. Budd, 6 Cal. 3d at 200, 491 P.2d at 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
50. See VanDerhoef, supra note 46, at 672.
51. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (quoting Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 511-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), affd, 439 A.2d 110
(Pa. 1981)).
55. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr.
849, 852 (1971).
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she is entitled., 56 In the wrongful life context, general damages are
"monetary compensation for the pain and suffering [the plaintiff]
will endure because of his or her hereditary affliction., 57 On the
other hand, special damages are "damages consequent upon but
distinct from harm to the plaintiffs entitlement."5 8 In the wrongful
life context, special damages include "the extraordinary, additional
medical expenses that are occasioned by the hereditary ailment." 59
Lastly, damages for lost earning capacity include "actual
[compensation] or the capacity to earn compensation if the injured
person is not employed at the time of the tortiously imposed
injury .. ,,60
Although the first three elements of a wrongful life claim are
typically uncontested, the last two present problems for California
courts. Johnson v. Superior Court61 illustrates the problems and
inequities with the analysis that California courts have traditionally
used to determine whether there is a legally cognizable injury and to
calculate damages.
IV. JOHNSON V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Facts
In 1986, Cryobank, a sperm bank, approved an individual
designated as Donor No. 276 as a sperm donor, but failed to inspect
Donor No. 276 for any potential hereditary kidney problems prior to
his approval.62 In 1988, Diane and Ronald Johnson approached
Cryobank about Donor No. 276, and the doctors falsely represented
that the sperm had been tested and screened for "reasonably
detectable genetically transferred" diseases.63 Donor No. 276 was a
carrier for a kidney disease called Autosomal Dominant Polycystic
Kidney Disease (ADPKD), a hereditary disorder that is marked by
56. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION 223 (2d ed. 1993).
57. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
58. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 226.
59. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
60. ROBERT S. THOMPSON ET AL., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION § 5.03, at 585 (3d ed. 2002).
61. 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (2002).
62. See id. at 874, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
63. See id.
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gross enlargement of the kidneys and progressive renal failure.64
The Johnsons conceived their daughter with Donor No. 276's sperm,
and Brittany Johnson was born with ADPKD.65
In 1999, the Johnsons and Brittany brought a claim against
California Cryobank, its officers, directors, and doctors for negligent
misrepresentation. 66 The trial court granted the doctors' motion for
summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation claim and on
the issue of damages, finding that Brittany was not entitled to recover
general damages or damages for lost earning capacity. 67 In October
2001, the Johnsons appealed, requesting reconsideration of the 1999
ruling that Brittany was not entitled to general damages or damages
for lost earning capacity.6
8
B. Court's Analysis
The California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's
assessment that the Johnson claim belonged under the rubric of
wrongful life and denied both general damages and damages for lost
earning capacity.69  In denying general damages, the court
exclusively relied on the California Supreme Court's two-prong
analysis in Turpin, which asks (1) Is there a legally cognizable
injury, and (2) are there rationally ascertainable damages? 70 As to
the first prong, the Turpin court stated that it is "impossible to
determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff
has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than not
being born., 71 Furthermore, the Turpin court agreed with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's statement in Gleitman that "the choice is
between a worldly existence and none at all .... To recognize a right
64. See Peter C. Harris & Vincente Torres, Autosomal Dominant Polycystic
Kidney Disease, GENE REVIEWS, Jan. 10, 2002, at http://www.geneclinics.org/
profiles/pkd-ad. (last visited Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter GENE REVIEWS].
65. See Johnson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 874, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
66. See id. at 873, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 874, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
70. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 230, 643 P.2d 954, 960, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 343 (1982).
71. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
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not to be born is to enter an area in which no one could find his
way."
72
As for rationally ascertainable damages, the Turpin court
explained that "even if it were possible to overcome the [legally
cognizable injury] hurdle, it would be impossible to assess general
damages in any fair, nonspeculative manner." 73 The Turpin court
further added that "what the plaintiff has 'lost' is not life without
pain and suffering but rather the unknowable status of never having
been born .... [A] rational, nonspeculative determination of a
specific monetary award... appears to be outside the realm of
human competence." 74 Moreover, like the Turpin court, the Johnson
court applied the Restatement's benefit doctrine.75 Under this
doctrine, "damages must be offset by the benefits incidentally
conferred by the defendant's conduct 'to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed.' 76 Brittany's harmed interest was her "general
physical, emotional and psychological well-being" but the doctor
conferred a benefit to Brittany in that she "obtained a physical
existence with the capacity both to receive and give love.., as well
as to experience pain and suffering., 77 The Johnson court agreed
with the Turpin court's conclusion that the "harm-benefit equation"
was "incalculable," and "a reasoned, nonarbitrary award of general
damage is simply not obtainable." 78 Thus, the Johnson court, like
the Turpin court, denied general damages.
In considering whether Brittany was entitled to damages for lost
earning capacity, the Johnson court exclusively relied on Andalon v.
Superior Court. The Johnson court agreed with the Andalon court's
conclusion that damages for lost earning capacity were like the claim
for general damages in Turpin, noting that "if defendants had
performed their jobs properly, [the child] would not have been born
72. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967).
73. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
74. Id. at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
75. See Johnson v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 887, 124 Cal. Rptr.
2d 650, 664-65 (2002).
76. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236-37, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)).
77. Johnson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 887, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664-65
(quoting Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347).
78. Id. at 887, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
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[without a genetic defect], but.., would not have been born at all."79
Furthermore, the Johnson court stated that Brittany "never had a
wage-earning capacity that was taken away by the conduct of the
doctor and cannot, therefore, claim compensation." 80 The Johnson
court went on to "recognize the harshness of the rules" propounded
in Turpin and Andalon, but stated that it was "nonetheless bound" by
these cases.
81
V. TURPIN V. SORTINI WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED: A LEGALLY
COGNIZABLE INJURY SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED
Under the test set forth in Turpin, a plaintiff must overcome two
hurdles to recover general damages in a wrongful life claim. First,
there must be a "legally cognizable injury," and second, the damages
flowing from that injury must be "rationally ascertainable. '" 82
However, the two-prong analysis the court applied in Turpin is
inappropriate because it fails to consider vitally important public
policy, relevant legislative enactments and case law. As a result,
Turpin was incorrectly decided, and the plaintiff was unfairly denied
relief.
A. The Turpin Court Failed to Consider Important Public Policy
Deterrence is an essential consideration in tort cases caused by
medical negligence. 83  Although the law cannot ease the mental
anguish the child plaintiff will experience, the law has the ability to
alleviate the financial burden.84  Allowing financial recovery for
general damages will remedy a legally cognizable wrong and will
consequently be a deterrent to professional irresponsibility. 85 This is
79. Id. at 888, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 (alteration in original) (quoting
Andalon v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 907
(1984)).
80. Id. (quoting Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907-
08).
81. Id. at 889, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666.
82. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
83. See Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians
for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1499-1500 (1978)
[hereinafter Father and Mother Know Best].
84. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967).
85. Cf id. (explaining that when a court declines to award compensation for
financial burdens, there is no deterrent to professional malpractice).
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significantly important in the transmission of genetic information
because advances in the study of human genetics "permit properly
advised prospective parents to learn of some elements of their risk of
having genetically defective children in time to include this factor in
their childbearing plans." 86  Nevertheless, "[g]enetic defects
represent an increasingly large part of the overall national health care
burden." 87 Thus, the law needs to ensure that genetic screeners and
counselors are doing their jobs properly to provide prospective
parents with the correct genetic information to make the most
informed childbearing decisions.
Interestingly, the Illinois court in Zepeda explained that
"[c]hanging... scientific advancements.., produce new problems
which are constantly thrust upon the courts. These problems often
require the remolding of the law, the extension of old remedies or the
creation of new and instant remedies .... ,88 Although Zepeda was
decided in 1963, even then the court recognized the need for
flexibility in the law. Today, the genetic revolution is a "scientific"
reality, and "[t]he commercial side of genetic engineering amplifies
the need for governmental regulation." 89 Judicial enforcement of
general damages in wrongful life causes of action will satisfy the
need for governmental regulation,90 and it will provide a deterrent
against negligent genetic engineering.
Dissenters might argue that the risk of rising costs for medical
malpractice insurance should be the paramount policy consideration.
Insurance companies might increase malpractice premiums if doctors
are legally accountable for general damages in the wrongful life
context. However, the California legislature has already addressed
concerns about the high cost of medical malpractice insurance by
passing the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA). 91 MICRA caps the amount of noneconomic losses at
$250,000 in "any action for injury against a health care provider
based on professional negligence., 92 Although MICRA's opponents
86. See Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 83, at 1492-93.
87. Id. at 1496.
88. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
89. John B. Attanasio, The Genetic Revolution: What Lawyers Don't Know,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 662, 666 (1988) (review essay).
90. Id.
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
92. Id.
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suggest otherwise,93 proponents of the legislation believe it was
"enacted to try and stop the kinds of runaway insurance costs caused
by unlimited judgments against physicians for malpractice.
'" 94
Although California, like other states, has experienced an increase in
jury awards, if it were not for MICRA, "awards would be
astronomically higher than they are." 95  California insurance
companies then do not have to "pass [astronomical] losses on to their
policyholders in the form of double- to triple-digit rate increases."
96
Therefore, MICRA has provided medical malpractice rate stability
for California doctors,97 and will continue to keep insurance costs
down at a consistent level even if doctors are held liable for general
damages in a wrongful life context.
Furthermore, an evaluation of insurance premium rates in
California and other states reveals that California doctors are
comparatively not overburdened with exorbitant insurance
premiums. 98 California's medical malpractice premiums are one-half
or one-third of premiums in other states.99 For instance, a California
93. Opponents of MICRA maintain that the legislation did not reduce
insurance premiums for doctors. For instance, the Foundation for Taxpayer &
Consumer Rights stated that "[t]he 1993 study of medical malpractice
insurance in California showed that MICRA had done little more than enrich
California malpractice insurers with excessive profits, at the expense of
malpractice victims." See Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights,
MICRA Did Not Lower Insurance Premiums in California, at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fs002695.php3 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003).
94. Brendan Doherty, California's Low Malpractice Rates Are No Medical
Error for Docs, SAN FRANCISCO Bus. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2001,
http://sanfrancisco.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2001/10/15/story6.htm
1.
95. David Ruvalcaba, Inside the Current Med Mal Market: Understanding




98. For instance, the "total premium in California for physician malpractice
increased from $228 million in 1976 to $612 million in 1999 (a 168 percent
increase over a 23-year period)." See Jay E. Shankar, President's Message:
Compare What MICRA Saves You, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PHYSICIAN, May
2002, http://www.sbcms.org/southcalphysician/2002/may/artl.htm. However,
the "total premium for the entire United States for physician malpractice
increased from $1.2 billion in 1976 to $6.2 billion in 1999. This reflects a 420
percent increase" over the same period. Id.
99. See Doherty, supra note 94.
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obstetrician pays between $35,000 and $40,000 per year for
malpractice insurance.'00 On the other hand, an obstetrician in
Pennsylvania pays between $80,000 and $120,000 per year for
malpractice insurance. 10 1 California doctors are already paying less
for medical malpractice insurance and are in a much better position
than most physicians in other states.
Finally, even if premiums were to initially rise in response to
wrongful life liability, if holding medical professionals liable
effectively deters further medical negligence, the overwhelming
benefit to patients would outweigh any increase in premiums for
physicians. The court in Park v. Chessin'0 2 correctly explained that
"the medical profession is [still] not 'unreasonably burdened' if held
liable in damages for the injuries caused to those who depend upon it
for their very lives."' 10 3 Hence, "where the medical profession is not
'unreasonably burdened,"' deterring medical negligence and
reducing the chance that a child will be born with a lifetime
debilitating impairment should outweigh any possibility that
malpractice premiums will increase.
B. The Turpin Court Failed to Consider California Legislation
Furthermore, the Turpin Court did not adequately consider
California statutory law. California Civil Code section 3281 states
that "[e]very person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or
omission of another, may recover from the person in fault...
compensation... ."104 Section 3282 defines detriment as "a loss or
harm suffered in person or property."' 05 The Civil Code specifically
includes the language, "every person,"'1 6 and does not distinguish
between persons who suffer detriment in a wrongful life context
from others who suffer "loss or harm."'1 7  Although the child
plaintiff in a wrongful life case would not have suffered detriment if
he were not born, neither would a plaintiff in any other tort action.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
103. Id. at211.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281 (West 1997).
105. Id. § 3282.
106. Id. § 3281
107. Id. § 3282.
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The harsh reality is that the child plaintiff in a wrongful life context
does suffer detriment and should "recover from the person in
fault. ,1
08
California Civil Code sections 3281 and 3282 are consistent
with the conclusion the court reached in Curlender. The Curlender
majority explained that, "a reverent appreciation of life compels
recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may be, has come
into existence as a living person with certain rights.'1°9  The
impaired plaintiff "both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of
others,"1 0 and thus should "recover from the person in fault."' 1 The
court's approach illustrates how the rubric of wrongful life should
not run counter to basic legislative initiatives and explains that courts
should not deny compensation to a plaintiff who exists and suffers
detriment.112 In denying recovery for a wrongful life claim, the
Turpin court incorrectly ignored this remedial statutory legislation,
which provides compensation for every person who has suffered a
detriment. 
113
C. The Turpin Court was Shortsighted in its Approach to
Nonexistence Versus Existence with Impairment
Although it is difficult to ascertain whether existence with
impairment versus nonexistence constitutes a legally cognizable
injury, the Turpin court incorrectly concluded that this task was
"impossible to determine in any rational or reasoned fashion."
114
The Turpin court stated that, "the value of a healthy existence over
an impaired existence is within the experience [or] imagination of
most people. The value of nonexistence... is not.' 15 Nevertheless,
the court simultaneously recognized that it could not "assert with
108. Id. § 3281.
109. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
110. Id.
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281.
112. See Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281.
114. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 235, 643 P.2d 954, 963, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 346 (1982).
115. Id. at 236, 643 P.2d at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47 (alteration in
original) (quoting Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)
(Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting), affd, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)).
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confidence that in every situation there would be a societal consensus
that life is preferable to never having been born at all."' 1 6 To make
this statement, the court must concede that there is some means to
evaluate existence with impairments versus "never having been born
at all."' 1 7 Thus, the court itself was shortsighted in its thinking, and
should have attempted to formulate some "rational or reasoned""
' 18
approach to measure whether life is preferable to never having been
born at all. After Turpin was decided, commentators have proposed
various solutions. 19
VI. A BETTER APPROACH TO A GENERAL DAMAGES ANALYSIS
A. Utilizing a Special Verdict Approach to Ascertain a Legally
Cognizable Injury
Because deterrence is such an integral factor in a wrongful life
case, it is crucial that courts do not continue to fall back on the
argument that it is impossible to analyze whether existence with an
impairment versus nonexistence constitutes a legally cognizable
injury. 120  Although it is admittedly difficult for a jury to decide
"whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born
impaired rather than not being born [at all], 121 it is not impossible so
long as there is convincing evidence of an injury. Therefore, a better
approach would be for the court to submit a two-factor inquiry to the
jury in a special verdict. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explain that in a special verdict, "the court may submit to the jury
written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer."
' 22
With a special verdict, "the court shall give to the jury such
116. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
119. See Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the
Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REv. 185, 239 (1993) (applying "a
presumption favoring nonexistence [as it] would equalize the burden of proof
in wrongful life cases and increase the plaintiff's chance of recovery."). Id.;
Dawe, supra note 3, at 496 (suggesting that if nonexistence would be valued at
zero, life with impairments would be assigned a number that hovers near zero,
with the most severe impairments being assigned a negative number, and the
less severe impairments being assigned a positive number).
120. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
121. Id.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
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explanation and instruction.., as may be necessary to enable the
jury to make its findings upon each issue."'123 Thus, the jury will be
able to differentiate between those injuries that justify an award and
those injuries that do not.
Using a special verdict approach, the first question submitted to
the jury is whether the impairment is an "extremely severe hereditary
disease." 124 The jury will take into account whether the disease leads
to a life-threatening condition and whether it is progressively
debilitating. The second question is whether the defendant doctor's
causal relationship to the plaintiffs impairment and suffering is
sufficient to justify an award. The jury will take into consideration
whether the defendant doctor was retained specifically for the
purpose of providing genetic information to the child plaintiff.
Because this analysis is subjective and the tort of wrongful life does
somewhat "retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life," 125 the
jury must answer both questions affirmatively for the court to find a
legally cognizable injury. If only one question is answered
affirmatively and the other question is not, the court will not find a
legally cognizable injury. This is because "the plaintiff is saddled
with the burden of proving that the benefits of nonexistence exceed
the burdens of her life" with impairments. 
126
1. What is an "extremely severe hereditary condition?"
In Turpin, the court noted that "it seems quite unlikely that a
jury would ever conclude that life with [deafness] is worse than not
being born at all. Other wrongful life cases, however, have involved
children with... extremely severe hereditary diseases. 127 Thus, to
distinguish between extremely severe hereditary conditions and those
123. Id.
124. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
125. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that "the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not to have
been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly
know whether that is so." Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J.
1967) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
126. Belsky, supra note 119, at 239.
127. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-
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that are not extremely severe,128 it is imperative to first ascertain
whether the condition leads to fatality, and secondly, whether it is a
progressive and debilitating condition.
One way to differentiate between an extremely severe condition
and one that is not is to investigate whether the impairment leads to
fatality. In Turpin, the child plaintiff was deaf.129 Although deafhess
is a socially, economically, and emotionally straining impairment,
there is no indication that it is life threatening. 30 Furthermore,
statistics show that deaf people live longer than those who can
hear.1 3 ' On the other hand, the child plaintiff in Johnson suffered
from ADPKD,132  a hereditary, life-threatening condition
"characterized by progressive cyst development and bilaterally
enlarged polycystic kidneys."' 33  Approximately 50% of patients
with ADPKD suffer end-stage renal disease by age sixty.'
34
Similarly, in Curlender, the child plaintiff suffered from a life-
threatening disease.' 35 The plaintiff was diagnosed with Tay-Sachs,
a "fatal progressive degenerative disease of the nervous system,"'
136
which leads to "relentless deterioration of mental and physical
abilities."'137 Furthermore, children with Tay-Sachs disease usually
die by age five.' 3
8
128. Id.
129. See id. at 223, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
130. See generally Dallas Otolaryngology Cochlear Implant Program, Facts
About Deafness, at http://www.dallascochlear.com/facts-aboutdeafness.htm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2002) (providing fifteen facts about deafness, none of
which points to fatality as a result of deafness) [hereinafter Facts About
Deafness].
131. See DeafNet, Interesting Facts About the Deaf, at
http://www.deaf.net/interesting.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter
DeafNet].
132. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 873, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2002).
133. GENE REVIEWS, supra note 64.
134. See id.
135. See Curlender v.Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477,481 (1980).
136. Id. at 815 n.4, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480 n.4 (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 366
N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y. 1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
137. Nat'l. Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Tay-Sachs
Disease Information Page, at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health and-medical/
disorders/taysachsdoc .htm (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter NINDS Tay-Sachs].
138. See id.
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A second way to differentiate the severity of the plaintiffs
condition is to consider the debilitating and progressive nature of the
condition. Although those who are deaf have numerous obstacles to
overcome, 139 many deaf people lead successful lives.140 Those who
cannot hear have developed their own language, known as American
Sign Language, which is a linguistically recognized language as is
English or any other language.14 ' Furthermore, over time those who
are deaf develop keener senses of observation and smell than those
who hear to compensate for their loss of hearing. 42 On the other
hand, ADPKD is progressively debilitating because the prevalence of
cysts "increases from 20% in the third decade to approximately 75%
after the sixth decade.'143 Tay-Sachs is even more debilitating and
progressive as "muscles begin to atrophy and paralysis sets in"
before death.144
Thus, Tay-Sachs is the epitome of a condition that a jury should
characterize as an extremely severe condition. Not only does Tay-
Sachs lead to fatality, it leads to death at an extremely young age.
On the other hand, the jury should not characterize deafness as an
extremely severe condition, because it does not lead to death and
does not have progressively debilitating effects. In the middle of the
spectrum is ADPKD, which the jury would have more difficulty
characterizing as an extremely severe condition. Although ADPKD
is not as medically severe a condition as Tay-Sachs because ADPKD
does not lead to fatality at such an early age, both medical conditions
could have life-ending ramifications. Therefore, a jury would likely
answer affirmatively the first special verdict question when a child
plaintiff suffers from ADPKD.
2. How closely connected does the defendant doctor have to be to
the plaintiff s injury?
For the jury to find a legally cognizable injury, it will also need
to conclude that the defendant doctor was closely connected to the
injury. Although this analysis is normally part of the proximate
139. See Facts About Deafness, supra note 130.
140. See DeafNet, supra note 131.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. GENE REvIEws, supra note 64.
144. NINDS Tay-Sachs, supra note 137.
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cause prong in a negligence cause of action,145 it still makes sense to
apply it in the wrongful life context to ascertain whether there is an
injury. Because a wrongful life injury admittedly involves some
notion of metaphysics, 146 the more closely connected the doctor is to
the injury, the less metaphysical it becomes. This is because a
wrongful life claim deals with "worldly existence [versus] none at
all, ' 147 and thus, the more connected the doctor's negligence is to the
existence, the easier it becomes for the jury to "find [its] way.., to
recognize a right not to be born. 1 48  In essence, the legally
cognizable injury becomes more palpable and enhances the "jury's
ability to say that the [plaintiffs injury] is manifest."'149
To ascertain the defendant doctor's degree of connection, the
jury will consider the purpose of the services rendered by the
defendant doctor. The jury will first determine whether the plaintiff
employed the doctor to provide genetic counseling. The specific
purpose of the employment needs to be for genetic counseling to
limit liability on the medical profession. If the plaintiffs parents
consulted the physician for a purpose other than genetic counseling,
then the jury should not consider the second question. However, if
the services were for genetic counseling, the jury will then consider
whether this genetic counseling was for the child plaintiff or for
another child, such as a sibling. Once again, to narrow the scope of
liability, the jury should only answer affirmatively to the second
inquiry in the special verdict if the defendant doctor rendered
services specifically in connection with the child plaintiff.
A review of the facts of Turpin, Curlender, and Johnson
illustrate the workings of the second special verdict inquiry. In
Turpin, the child plaintiffs parents did not retain the defendant
doctor for genetic consultation directly in connection with the child
145. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229, 643 P.2d 954, 960, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 343 (1982) (quoting Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d
433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971)).
146. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 826, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (1980).
147. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967).
148. Id.
149. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346
(quoting Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (Spaeth,
J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)).
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plaintiff. 50 Instead, a hearing specialist incorrectly advised the
plaintiffs parents that their other child's hearing was within normal
range. 151 Because the purpose of the defendant doctor's services
were not for genetic counseling and not rendered for the child
plaintiff, the jury should not answer the second question
affirmatively on this set of facts. Although this conclusion might
seem unfair considering that the defendant doctor's relationship to
the plaintiff's injury would probably meet the traditional proximate
cause test, some harshness is necessary because the cause of action is
admittedly "metaphysical."15 2
While in Turpin the plaintiff was conceived as an indirect result
of the defendant doctor's negligence, the child plaintiff in Johnson
was conceived as a direct result of the defendant doctor's
negligence. 153 In Johnson, the child's parents relied on the sperm
bank's doctors to provide accurate genetic information on the sperm
they would use to conceive the child plaintiff.154 Analogously, in
Curlender, the defendant laboratory rendered services to ascertain
whether the child plaintiffs parents were carriers of the Tay-Sachs
gene.155 "Relatively simple" blood tests would show whether "both
parents [were] carriers" and only then would "there be a great
likelihood of the presence of the disease in the offspring."'
56
However, the plaintiff alleged that this "relatively simple" blood test
was not accurately completed, and the plaintiff's parents were
negligently misinformed that they were not carriers.' 5 7 Thus, in both
Johnson and Curlender, the defendants were retained for the purpose
of genetic consultation directly in connection with the child plaintiff.
Because both considerations under the second inquiry are met, the
jury should answer the inquiry affirmatively, and the doctors in
Curlender and Johnson would be liable.
150. See id. at 223, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
151. See id.
152. See Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
153. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 873, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 650, 653 (2002).
154. Seeid.
155. See Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
156. Id. at 816 n.4, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480 n.4 (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 366
N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y. 1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting)).
157. See id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
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Critics may argue that the special verdict approach would lead to
a decrease in genetic counseling, because it would likely hold more
doctors liable for their negligence. Arguably "practitioners [might]
wonder how far to go in counseling couples," and might advise
parents to avoid conception "rather than take the chance of
compensating a claimant for lifetime care."' 5 8 However, even if
doctors are more conservative and cautious when advising patients
about whether to conceive, doctors still do not "make the ultimate
choice."15 9 Although genetic counselors "possess information that
deciders often cannot otherwise easily obtain," the "choice among
various courses of action" still lies with the parents.1 60 As long as
doctors "disclose those risks that would be relevant to a reasonable
person," they "preserve parental autonomy in procreative
decisionmaking" and are insulated from any liability.1 61 Thus, the
special verdict analysis would only hold liable those doctors who
negligently fail to disclose ascertainable risks to prospective parents.
Critics may also argue that increased wrongful life liability will
"boost medical expenses" by increasing "the number of diagnostic
tests ordered for mothers-to-be."' 162 However, more thorough testing
can only serve to give "prospective parents... [the] reproductive
options that a reasonable person would want to know in deciding
whether to procreate," and "parents will be given the opportunity to
act to avert the birth of children with genetic defects.' 63 Therefore,
more cautious genetic counseling and additional testing will allow
parents to make better informed choices about whether to conceive,
while curtailing professional negligence and wrongful life suits.
Once the jury can more easily ascertain a legally cognizable
injury, the next hurdle is to calculate damages. Although computing
a "specific monetary award" 164 is admittedly difficult, it can be done,
so this difficulty should not be permitted to justify denying liability.
158. Constance Frisby Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal and Medical Aspects, 75
KY. L.J. 585, 628-29 (1987).
159. See Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 83, at 1507.
160. Id. at 1507-08.
161. Id. at 1509-10.
162. See Fain, supra note 158, at 628.
163. Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 83, at 1508.
164. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 236, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 347 (1982).
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B. Damages Are Not "Incalculable"
1. The United States Supreme Court's viewpoint on damages
Although the California Supreme Court in Turpin concluded that
"it would be impossible to assess general damages in any fair,
nonspeculative manner," 165 the court overlooked United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence on damages. In Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,166 the United States Supreme
Court explained:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the
ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice
to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve
the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.'
67
The Supreme Court further stated that "damages may not be
determined by mere speculation."' 68  The inclusion of the word
"mere" implies that some speculation is allowed as long as there is
"evidence [to] show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and
reasonable inference."' 69 Taken together, these two Supreme Court
statements set forth two important principles: (1) Even if damages
cannot be determined with "certainty," they are not altogether
precluded; and (2) a certain amount of speculation is inherent in
reaching a determination of damages.
On the contrary, the California Supreme Court in Turpin
reasoned that damages could not be calculated with certainty and
thus only compensated the plaintiff for nonspeculative damages. 7°
The Turpin court's approach is antithetical to the Supreme Court's
more relaxed approach in Story Parchment. In denying general
damages and relief to the injured person, the Turpin court ignores
"fundamental principles of justice," and "relieve[s] the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts."'
71
165. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
166. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
167. Id. at 563. Although Story Parchment dealt with antitrust law, its basic
recovery principles are applicable in a wrongful life context.
168. Id. at 563.
169. Id.
170. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
171. Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563.
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Moreover, the California Supreme Court's "nonspeculative"
approach in Turpin contrasts with its very own approach to damages
in Beagle v. Vasold.172 There, the court unambiguously stated that in
determining compensation for pain and suffering, "the chief reliance
for reaching reasonable results.., must be the restraint and common
sense of the jury.' 73 Allowing for the common sense of the jury
implicitly allows for some speculation. Thus, the Turpin court's
overly strict approach to damages is not only contrary to the
Supreme Court's approach in Story Parchment, which allows for
some degree of speculation, but is also inconsistent with its own
more relaxed approach to computing damages in Beagle.
2. The Restatement's benefit doctrine is not applicable in the
wrongful life context
Although the Turpin court applied the Restatement's benefit
doctrine in its attempt to compute damages, the benefit doctrine is
not applicable in the wrongful life context. The Turpin court
semantically differentiates the burdens from the benefits.1
74
Nonetheless, the burden is the existence with impairments, and the
benefit is existence, but with impairments. Because the burdens and
benefits seem to be synonymous with one another and would seem to
cancel each other out, the approach is not incalculable,' 75 rather it
equals zero.
Although the Restatements are considered persuasive authority
created by judges, professors, and lawyers, "Restatements in and of
themselves are not primary law."' 76 Given that the Turpin court's
reliance on the benefit doctrine to calculate general damages was
questionable, the Johnson court should have considered the
reasoning in Curlender and awarded damages "on the basis of the
plaintiffs mental and physical condition at birth and her expected
172. 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966).
173. Id. at 172, 417 P.2d at 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (quoting CHARLES
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 88, at 319 (West
1935)).
174. See supra Part IV.B.
175. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
176. Harvard Law School Library, Restatements of the Law, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/research--guides/restatements.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2003).
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condition during the... life span... anticipated for one with her
impaired condition."
177
3. Method for calculating general damages
Rather than categorically denying general damages to wrongful
life plaintiffs, a better approach would be to incorporate the
Curlender court's reasoning and award damages based on the
plaintiffs mental and physical condition at birth and her expected
condition during her anticipated lifespan. Although some may argue
that there is "no reliable data or element of certainty"'178 from which
the amount can be accurately measured, California courts should
allow the jury to rely on "'probable and inferential... [evidentiary]
proof', 179 and "common sense'18°  to ascertain a "reasonable...
estimate" of damages.' 81
The jury will focus on evidentiary proof of the severity of the
injury in accordance with the jury's common sense to guide its
damages determination. z8 2 For instance, for those injuries that the
jury characterizes as an "extremely severe condition" in the legally
cognizable injury analysis,' 83 the jury should award a higher amount
of general damages. On the other hand, for an injury that is not
characterized as an "extremely severe condition," the jury should
award a lesser amount of general damages. This approach is
consistent with the more relaxed position of both the United States
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court toward a jury's
computation of general damages.
177. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 489 (1980).
178. Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 564 (citing Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich.
117, 129 (1871)).
179. Id. (quoting Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 555 (1863)).
180. See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 172, 417 P.2d 673, 675, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 131 (1966).
181. Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 565 (quoting Gilbert, 22 Mich. at 131).
182. See Beagle, 65 Cal. 2d at 172, 417 P.2d at 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
183. See supra Part VI.A.
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VII. DAMAGES FOR LOST EARNING CAPACITY ANALYSIS
California courts have not awarded child plaintiffs damages for
lost earning capacity in wrongful life cases.'8 4 For instance, the
California Court of Appeal in Andalon denied damages for lost
earning capacity because it believed that "the plaintiff-child's claim
for loss of earning capacity [was] controlled by the [general
damages] reasoning in Turpin."' 5 The Andalon court stated, "There
is no loss of earning capacity caused by the doctor in negligently
permitting the child to be born with a genetic defect that precludes
earning a living. One cannot lose what one never had. 1 86 In other
words, the court mistakenly believed that the plaintiff did not suffer a
legally cognizable injury and thus could not recover damages for lost
earning capacity.
A. Damages for Lost Earning Capacity Are Comparable to Special
Damages, Not General Damages
The Turpin court limited its treatment of general damages to
"pain and suffering [the plaintiff] will endure because of his or her
hereditary affliction. 1 87 Moreover, the Turpin court differentiated
between general damages, which are intangible in nature and are
very difficult to measure, and special damages, such as
"extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training and
[medical] equipment," which are tangible, economically quantifiable
costs.188 This explicit differentiation was appropriate because "the
term special damages is almost always used in contrast to general
damages."
189
Furthermore, the Turpin court stated that special damages, such
as medical expenses, are "the kind of pecuniary losses which are
readily ascertainable and regularly awarded as damages in
professional malpractice actions."1 90  Similarly, a claim for lost
184. See, e.g., Andalon v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 614, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 899, 907-08 (1984).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 236, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 347 (1982).
188. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
189. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 226.
190. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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income is a "pecuniary loss," which compensates for "actual
[earnings losses] or the [loss of] capacity to earn compensation.'191
Thus, both medical expenses and lost earning capacity involve
"pecuniary" projection instead of "pain and suffering" projection.
Because the special damages portion of the Turpin decision is "far
from dictum" and "is a full-fledged holding of [California's] highest
court and binding on lower courts,"'192 lower California courts could
and should differentiate between general damages and damages for
lost earning capacity.
Additionally, Professor Dobbs writes that "one common form of
[special] damages is the claim.., to lost income. . . , and in a proper
case [that claim] is recoverable as such."'193 Similarly, California
courts group damages for medical expenses and lost earning capacity
under the auspices of special damages. For instance, in Chitkin v.
Lincoln National Insurance Co.19 the court noted that special
damages included "both medical expenses and loss of income."'
195
Thus, it makes sense that damages for lost earning capacity should be
analyzed under the same umbrella as special damages, not general
damages, which consequently avoids complication over whether
there is a legally cognizable injury. As long as the defendant's
negligence meets the other four elements-duty, breach, proximate
cause, and damages 19 6 -the plaintiff should recover damages for lost
earning capacity.
Again, critics may argue that liability for damages for lost
earning capacity exposes healthcare providers to an increase in
malpractice insurance premiums. MICRA only places a recovery
limit on "noneconomic losses,"'197 and unlike general damages,
damages for lost earning capacity are an economic lOSS.198 Thus, in
191. ROBERT S. THOMPSON ET AL., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION § 5.03, at 585 (3d ed. 2002).
192. Hegyes v. Unjian Enters. Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1137, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 106 (1991) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
193. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 226-27.
194. 879 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
195. Id. at 847.
196. See Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr.
849, 852 (1971) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971)).
197. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1997).
198. See THOMPSONETAL.,supra note 191, at 585.
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the case of damages for lost earning capacity, MICRA would not
prevent a jury from awarding compensation that exceeds
$250,000.'99 Critics may argue that because damages are not limited
by MICRA, insurance companies will respond by increasing
malpractice premiums.
However, as in the case of general damages, the balance
between deterrence and rising insurance premiums once again falls
heavily on the side of deterrence. If doctors are not held liable for
their negligent actions, it will "enable parties to profit by... their
own wrongs... and invite depredation." 200  Therefore, a fear of
rising insurance premiums should not preclude the obvious parallels
between damages for lost earning capacity and special damages.
B. Utilizing the Proposed Special Verdict Analysis to Determine the
Legally Cognizable Injury Prong in Damages for Lost Earning
Capacity
Even if a California court does not agree that damages for lost
earning capacity are really a form of special damages and should be
analyzed without consideration of legally cognizable injury, a court
still should not utilize the Turpin categorical general damages rule in
considering damages for lost earning capacity. Although the
proposed two-inquiry special verdict will not compensate all
wrongful life claimants for loss of earning capacity, at least some
claimants will be compensated instead of categorically excluding all
wrongful life claimants. A court should utilize the two-part special
verdict analysis to determine damages for lost earning capacity in the
same manner suggested above for general damages. Both the
severity of the impairment inquiry and the defendant's connection to
the injury inquiry need to be answered affirmatively to conclude
there is a legally cognizable injury before the jury calculates
damages for lost earning capacity.
C. Method for Calculating Damages for Lost Earning Capacity
Although "[a]n award for loss of earning capacity is inherently
speculative and not always calculable with mathematical
199. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b).
200. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
564 (1931) (quoting Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 130 (1871)).
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certainty,, 20 1 courts have awarded damages for lost earning capacity
to plaintiffs.2 °2  Damages for child plaintiffs are "especially
speculative, because [children] lack an established record of
earnings, well-developed skills, and expressed career goals. 20 3
Nevertheless, courts have used a combination of objective and
subjective factors to determine a child plaintiffs earning capacity "in
allowing at least some damages even where there is no evidence on
which to base an award.
',2 04
For its objective analysis, the court should consult "gender, age,
and race-based tables to predict the number of years that the plaintiff
would have remained in the labor force and to determine his or her
expected average wages." 20 5  Then it should utilize experts to
analyze subjective factors such as the plaintiffs Intelligence
Quotient and the socio-economic status of the plaintiffs family.
20 6
With this combination of objective and subjective factors, a court
could award an amount of damages for lost earning capacity that is
just and proportional to the plaintiffs injury, instead of completely
denying recovery under the Andalon reasoning.
D. Damages for Lost Earning Capacity Analysis for the Johnson
Facts
The Johnson court was not bound to follow the Andalon
reasoning, and it should not have done so. The Andalon case was
decided by the California Court of Appeal, which is not the state's
highest court and is not binding on the Johnson case.
207
Furthermore, even the Andalon court itself notes that Turpin's
208holding does not foreclose an award for loss of earning capacity.
201. Meshell v. Lovell, 732 So. 2d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 1999).
202. See Murray v. Sanford, 487 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997);
Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
203. Laura Greenberg, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals
for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV.
429, 440 (2001).
204. Id. at 441-42.
205. Id. at 443.
206. See id. at 445.
207. Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1137, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 106 (1991) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
208. See Andalon v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 613-14, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 899, 907-08 (1984). The court stated, "we conclude Turpin's use of the
term general damages is limited to recovery for pain and suffering. Other...
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Thus, the Johnson court should have either analyzed damages for
lost earning capacity under the special damages rubric or used a
special verdict approach to bypass the legally cognizable injury
hurdle. Once it is determined that there is a legally cognizable
injury, the jury should use a combination of objective and subjective
factors to fix an amount. Brittany Johnson deserved to be
compensated for her loss of earning capacity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The wrongful life cause of action is admittedly abstract and
metaphysical due to the philosophical nature of existence with
impairment versus nonexistence. 20 9 California courts should not use
the philosophical nature of the tort to categorically deny all wrongful
life plaintiffs general damages and damages for lost earning capacity;
instead, the court should employ the proposed special verdict
analysis. The two-part special verdict inquiry facilitates the jury's
role in determining whether there is a legally cognizable injury and
ensures that general damages and damages for lost earning capacity
are reasonably calculable.
Because the tort does hinge on metaphysics, there concededly
should be a limit to the liability imposed on the medical
profession.21 ° Consequently, in considering the nature of the injury,
the special verdict analysis does limit liability to only those plaintiffs
suffering particularly impaired existences. If California were to
adopt this method of analysis, there may still be children who suffer
injuries caused by negligent physicians who would not meet the
criteria and unfortunately would not be compensated. However,
instead of the Turpin/Andalon categorical rule that no children are
compensated for a life of debilitating impairment, under the special
verdict analysis, those who most deserve to be compensated will be
afforded a remedy. Holding the medical profession responsible for
negligence that results in a life of seriously impaired existence will
elements of damage must be evaluated pursuant to Turpin's reasoning, but are
not controlled by its holding." Id. at 613-14, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08.
209. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
210. See id.
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ensure that "a wrong with serious consequential injury [will not] go
wholly unredressed. ' '211  *Jason Skolnik*
211. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount
University; B.S., Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University,
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